O KOGNITIVNOM STATUSU MENTALNIH PROSTORA I O NEKIM TIPOVIMA METONIMIJE U OKVIRU TEORIJE KONCEPTUALNE INTEGRACIJE by Branimir Belaj
J e z i k o s l o v l j e  




Received on 28.10. 2005.
Accepted for publication 30.11. 2005.
Branimir Belaj 
Josip Juraj Strossmayer University 
Faculty of Philosophy 
Osijek
On the cognitive status of mental spaces  
and of some types of metonymy
within Conceptual Integration Theory 
In the light of the automatic nature of the process of conceptual integration we ex-
amine the cognitive-conceptual status of the four types of mental spaces and their 
elements: the input spaces, the generic space and the blend. On the basis of the 
differences obtaining between the four types of mental spaces we divide them into 
defocused, highlighted and focal mental spaces. We further discuss the place and 
manner of intepretation of two basic types of metonymy in the context of blending 
theory and propose the introduction of a fifth mental space where such metony-
mies would be interpreted, namely the pre-input spaces in the case of non-
metaphoric counterfactuals, or the pre-target space when metonymy operates 
within a metaphoric utterance.  
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1. Introduction 
The theory of conceptual integration has flourished over the past ten years 
mostly due to the efforts of G. Fauconnier and M. Turner (Fauconnier-Turner 
1996, 1998, 1999, 2002; Turner-Fauconnier 1995, 2000). It has emerged as a 
lanci – Articles - Artikel 
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compatible refinement of Lakoff’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) as a 
standard two-domain account of metaphor focused primarily on mental repre-
sentations, while Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT) is more focused on cog-
nitive processes. Apart from that, CIT is broader in scope in that it tries to pro-
vide a framework not just for metaphor and metonymy, but also for analogy, 
counterfactual conditioning, and a host of other mental operations. 
Conceptual integration operates in many areas - everyday meaning construction, con-
ceptual change, metaphor and analogy, scientific discovery, counterfactual reasoning, 
grammar, action and design. (Fauconnier & Turner 1999: 76).
It follows from the above that within the theory of conceptual integration meta-
phor interpretation becomes but a portion of the overall cognitive process and as 
such loses the primacy it has enjoyed in cognitive linguistics since early 1980s. 
In contrast to the two-domain model, Fauconnier and Turner set up the so-called 
multispace model which, in prototypical cases1 includes the following spaces. 
First, there are two input mental spaces with their elements that roughly corre-
spond, in the case of metaphor, to the source and target domains of CMT. Sec-
ond, there is a generic space, which is a schematization of the commonalities 
obtaining between the input spaces. This generic space licences mappings be-
tween elements of the two input spaces in the case of metaphor; it allows for 
their common participation in the integrated space – the blend - in nonmeta-
phoric utterances. The blend is the fourth and the pivotal mental space in the 
theory of conceptual integration; it is the central mental space which captures 
the essence of the entire theory. This mental space is the locus of semantic and 
conceptual interpretation of utterances; it is a unit structured by its own logic 
and consists in a combination of elements from each input space and potentially 
of some new elements not contained in either input. The blend is a dynamic en-
tity, it is open to various contextually-dependent interpretations, to various sub-
conscious expansions of the basic conceptual structure, which is steered by indi-
vidual knowledge and experience. Clearly, the CIT model prefers the notion of 
mental space to the classical notion of conceptual domains,2  and defines the 
mental spaces as
1 In this paper we shall not discuss more complex conceptual integration networks which, e.g. 
contain multiple blends, contain blends which may serve as inputs for further blends or 
complex networks containing the so called megablends etc. For a discussion of such and 
similar complex networks see Fauconnier & Turner (2002). 
2  It should be pointed out that the notion of domain is not really discarded since dynamic 
mental spaces derive their structure from more stable conceptual domains.
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small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local un-
derstanding and action...They are interconnected, and can be modified as thought 
and discourse unfold. Mental spaces can be used generally to model dynamic map-
pings in thought and language. (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 40).  
Mental spaces serve to combine elements that belong to different conceptual 
domains, tying them into homogenous and elastic, yet stable, conceptual frames. 
We understand the notion of elastic stability in terms of a stable basic concep-
tual structure which is subject to various elaborations under the impact of indi-
vidual knowledge, experience and imagery which are imaginatively activated at 
a given moment of conceptualization. Cf. Fig. 1.
                                                              GENERIC SPACE 
                                   I1                                                                                  I2 
                                                                      BLEND 
Fig. 1. Basic model of conceptual integration 
      (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 46) 
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2. Discussion 
This paper will address two issues which, in our opinion, merit more attention 
than they have received in the theory of conceptual integration: 
A) the question of the cognitive status of individual mental spaces and 
their elements in the process of conceptual integration and, by exten-
sion, their representation in the conceptual integration diagram
B) the question of the relationships between two basic types of meton-
ymy and input spaces in the process of conceptual integration 
2.1. The nature of mental spaces 
In an attempt to answer our first question and elucidate the status of individual 
mental spaces during conceptual integration, we move on to consider Faucon-
nier & Turner’s well-known example of counterfactual3 sentence (Fauconnier & 
Turner 2002: 225)
(1) In France, Watergate would not have harmed Nixon. 
This example invites the hearer to create two input mental spaces. The first men-
tal space, which is motivated by the story of Nixon and Watergate, also features 
the USA’s geographical position and some elements of its political system – the 
president, the election system, American voters, congressmen, senators, the me-
dia etc. The second mental space is motivated by the adverbial in France and is 
structured by the knowledge of French geography and corresponding elements 
of the French political system. The generic space contains elements shared by 
both input spaces, in this case, according to G. Fauconnier and M. Turner (Fau-
connier & Turner 2002: 226), it is the domain of Western democracy in which 
every country is headed by a president chosen by the people in democratic elec-
tions. The president is also head of a political party which enters into a race with 
competing political parties to gain leadership of the country. Further, the presi-
dent’s actions are limited by law and monitored by the public eye, whereby the 
public has the capacity to request impeachment should the president violate 
rules and limitations. Through a combination of individual elements from input 
spaces the brain sets up and activates a dynamic blend in which a situation 
3 Counterfactuals are one of the most frequently analyzed and the most interesting types of 
utterances in the CIT. They embody unlikely and impossible situations which open avenues of 
possibilities for the creation of blends, fostering the inventiveness and creativity of the human 
mind. 
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analogous to the Watergate scandal is located in France, but the potential French 
president does not suffer the fate that Nixon did in the USA. The reasons may be 
many, like e.g., no keen interest of the French voting public in political scandals, 
more lenient penalties for illegal actions during election campaigns, less scan-
dal-seeking press etc.
The important questions we should now stop to ask are: Which mental spaces 
and which of their elements are in the focus of our consciousness, and which, on 
the other hand, are defocused and why? What is the cognitive status of the men-
tal spaces at that very moment? 
The basic diagram of conceptual integration shown in Fig. 1. only allows us 
to identify the blend as the primary mental space. The generic space and the in-
put spaces, on the other hand, are represented as standing on an equal footing, 
which implies their conceptual equivalence and thus contributes to a neglect of 
their differences at the key moment of utterance interpretation, i.e. at the mo-
ment of creation of the blend. We strongly believe that a more detailed elabora-
tion of the relationship between the cognitive status of mental spaces and the 
moment of utterance interpretation would enhance the explanatory power of the 
theory of conceptual integration. Thus we propose a division of the mental 
spaces and their elements into the following three groups: 
(i) defocused (shematic and non-shematic ) mental spaces and de-
focused elements
(ii) highlighted (specific)  mental spaces and highlighted elements 
(iii) focal mental spaces and focal elements
Let us first turn to the cognitive-conceptual4 status of the generic space.
We do not aim here to question the status of the generic space as a schemati-
zation of the commonalities of the inputs, nor, from a purely theoretical perspec-
tive, its key role in the integration of elements from the input spaces; we simply 
want to look into its role and cognitive-conceptual value in actual communica-
tion.
The generic space together with its elements represents a defocused space be-
cause its conscious activation in on-line utterance interpretation takes extra cog-
nitive effort. This is due to its schematic nature, i.e. the fact that it consists of 
4 We use the term cognitive-conceptual in the line with Ruiz de Mendoza and Peña Cervel’s 
(2002: 139) distinction between the term cognitive, which refers to the dynamics of mental 
spaces, and the term conceptual, which refers to the result of such processes. 
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superordinate terms, of hyperonyms at the highest level of conceptualization in 
the taxonomic model of categorization. We are all familiar with the fact that 
terms superordinate to those on the basic level exhibit certain linguistic anoma-
lies, like incomplete morphology, e.g. as manifested in their exhibiting single 
number categories or single gender categories, or their weak word-formation po-
tential. Since human conceptual system, i.e. the conceptualization, representa-
tion, understanding and cognition of extralinguistic referents, strongly affects 
the language system (determining the composition, form and distribution of lin-
guistic units, and not vice versa as had often been stressed in various structural-
ist approaches), such grammatical and word-formational anomalies exhibited by 
superordinate terms can be regarded as a direct consequence of their conceptual 
anomalies. These in turn come about as a result of our inability to conceptualize 
at highest levels of categorization. It is only the extremely abstract and general 
terms that operate on such conceptual levels. They are conceptually rather inac-
cessible terms that rarely if ever serve as ‘vehicles’ of neutral everyday commu-
nication. E. Rosch’s (1975) and Rosch and Mervis’s (1975) seminal papers and 
research have proved that communication operates on basic levels, as the last 
levels of conceptualization, since they maximize the number of relevant attrib-
utes common to members of a category, and minimize the number of attributes 
shared with members of other categories. This implies that we cannot e.g. think 
about fruit as fruit, but only of fruit as bananas, apples, pears etc. If, for exam-
ple, we saw someone eating a strange kind of fruit and not knowing what it was 
we asked what they were eating, the term used in the answer would almost be-
yond doubt be represented at the basic level of categorization, e.g., mango. It is 
very unlikely that the person would say they were eating a special kind of 
mango, less so they were eating fruit. Also, in our Nixon - France example we 
cannot conceive of the country or the president as generic concepts, but on hear-
ing the utterance our conscious mind activates lower categorization levels only, 
i.e. the actual countries, the actual presidents, existing geographical areas etc. 
which belong to the input spaces and thus ensure their conceptual precedence 
over the generic space. Because of that, the generic space is also in a sense a 
broader mental space than either the input spaces or the blend. Its size is not due 
to a greater number of elements contained in it as opposed to other spaces, but is 
a result of its global nature. More specifically, the generic space comprises ge-
neric concepts and generic properties and it just has the function of licensing the 
correlation between the inputs. Thus, for example, the generic concept country
in example (1) encompasses the generic property of being a country and is pre-
sent as an element of the generic space in many other examples besides France
and the USA.
As regards the input spaces, they usually accommodate the communicatively 
relevant categorization levels, basic levels and their subordinated levels of cate-
J e z i k o s l o v l j e  
6 . 2  ( 2 0 0 5 ) :  1 1 9 - 1 4 4 125
gorization, which guarantees their status of highlighted mental spaces. However, 
although the input spaces in general are highlighted mental spaces, not all of 
their elements are. This is not the case, as we recall, with the generic space 
which in its entirety belongs to the conceptual background. Conceptual integra-
tion is subject to selective projection, highlighting only those elements which are 
actually projected into the blend. The fact that only some of the input space ele-
ments participate in the blend has been noted by Fauconnier and Turner: “Not 
all elements and relations from the inputs are projected to the blend.” (Faucon-
nier & Turner 2002: 47).  
After the completion of the integration-projection process, elements which at 
first were only highlighted, assume the value of focal, most prominent elements, 
creating the smallest, yet conceptually the most salient focal space – the blend. 
The salient elements in example (1) are e.g. the French geographical area and 
French voters. They are projected into the blend, where they assume features of 
focal elements, while the American geographical area and American voters,
given their failure to participate in forming the dynamic blended space, belong 
to background elements of the second input space. Given what has just been said 
and in line with the usual formal apparatus of cognitive linguistics, the dia-
grammatic representations of the different mental spaces should differ, making 
their relative cognitive values and conceptual hierarchies stand out with more 
prominence. The generic space and its elements, as cognitively almost com-
pletely defocused elements in on-line interpretation, can formally be represented 
by dashed lines; input spaces, as conceptually highlighted spaces, can be drawn 
in solid lines, while the focal nature of the blend can be represented by heavy 
lines. Representations of elements belonging to different mental spaces should 
also vary. Elements that are projected into the blend may be represented by 
heavy lines, others either by solid or dashed lines, depending on their cognitive-
conceptual value within a single input space. Example (1) is one of many exam-
ples5 which, according to Fauconnier & Turner (2002: 225) and Taylor (2002: 
531), among other things, call for the introduction of context into the diagram, 
since the context, whatever its nature and however determined, steers utterance 
interpretation. Thus the interpretation of utterance (1) in the blend may be based 
on a lesser interest of the French public in political affairs and scandals, on 
greater leniency of the French press, or on less severe legal
5 Among more familiar and oft quoted examples of counterfactuals which licence multiple 
contextually determined interpretations is Turner & Fauconnier's (2000: 133) famous Titanic
example where the political survival of Bill Clinton following the affair with Monica 
Lewinsky is compared to the sinking of the Titanic (If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg 
would sink.) and Taylor's (2002: 530) examle transplanting this affair, as well as Nixon, into 
France (In France, Bill Clinton would not have been harmed by his affair with Monica 
Lewinsky.)
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                                                            GENERIC SPACE 
 I1                                                                                        I2 
                    CONTEXT
                BLEND 
Fig. 2. Basic model of conceptual integration in on-line utterance interpretation 
J e z i k o s l o v l j e  
6 . 2  ( 2 0 0 5 ) :  1 1 9 - 1 4 4 127
penalties that affect presidential candidates in such circumstances. Figure 2 
represents a proposal of the basic model of conceptual integration in the light of 
the momentary nature of on-line utterance interpretation. 
The following counterfactual and metaphorical example illustrates even more 
clearly the cognitive-conceptual value of elements of input spaces and the proc-
ess of conceptual integration: 
(2) England will find it hard to beat German arguments in favor of Croatia’s 
accession to the European Union. 
We can use this example to vividly and metaphorically show how, on the one 
hand, elements to be projected into the blend are profiled, and on the other, the 
remaining ones, i.e. those that stay in the inputs, are pushed into conceptual 
background. Following the interpretation of double metonymy, to which we 
shall return later, (PLACE FOR INSTITUTION > INSTITUTION FOR 
PEOPLE), the blend accommodates only a few members of special delegations 
of the ministries of foreign affairs of the two countries, who thus gain the status 
of focal elements. With the activation of the blend, these members enter into a 
dynamic discussion. The focal elements of the blend hence become conceptually 
clear or sharp (conceptually known), other members of the ministries, who do 
not participate in the discussion, remain somewhat in the shadow (are conceptu-
ally less known), while members of the two governments who belong to other 
ministries (ministry of education, health department etc.) are completely out-
shadowed (conceptually unknown) and stand in the background. Members of the 
two governments who are not projected into the blend remain in the input 
spaces. According to our diagram (Fig. 2.), members of the two ministries of 
foreign affairs not participating in the discussion, i.e. who are not projected into 
the blend, would be represented in solid lines, while members of other ministries 
would be represented by dashed lines due to their being even more conceptually 
defocussed.
This metaphoric relationship, namely, the interaction of light and dark in the 
source domain, which corresponds to an analogous conceptual reduction of ele-
ments from the input spaces and their projection into the blend in the target do-
main is shown in Figure 3.
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                                                              GENERIC SPACE 
Members                    Members
    of English of German
Government                                           Government
METAPHORIC MAPPINGS
                          (ARGUMENT IS WAR)
Members of the                                                                                    Members of the
    Ministry of Foreign                                                                             Ministry of Foreign
        Affairs                             Affairs    
     
            Special                    Special
               delegation of the                                                            delegation of the
               Ministry of Foreign Affairs                  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Dynamic discussion between Dynamic discussion between
representatives         representatives
of the delegation of the delegation
                                                                             BLEND
Fig. 3.  Stages in the development of the blend (illustrated with the help of metaphor 
KNOWN IS LIGHT/UNKNOWN IS DARK) 
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The KNOWN IS LIGHT and UNKNOWN IS DARK6 metaphors are actually 
submetaphors which jointly allow for the interpretation of a more general meta-
phor KNOWING IS SEEING. Only that which can be seen can be truly known, 
things can be seen only if they stand in the light, i.e. light makes us able to see. 
Given the interconnection and integration of these metaphors, we stop here to 
make an interesting digression. There is a phenomenon in our physical world 
where ease of interpretation depends on the relationship between light and dark. 
This phenomenon, we believe, strongly corroborates our approach to conceptual 
integration through the prism of the metaphorical relationship between light and 
dark. Namely, elements and stages of conceptual integration can be compared to 
a photograph, i.e. to the process of making a photograph. A part of the camera, 
the blend, is responsible for achieving the optimal relative amount of light and 
dark thus making the photograph clear and sharp. We could draw two parallels 
between the process of making a photograph and the process of conceptual inte-
gration. Since visualization is one of the most important elements of conceptu-
alization, the first parallel that can be drawn is that between the blend as part of 
the camera which strikes the right balance between light and dark in a photo-
graph on the one hand, and on the other, the cognitive mechanisms in the brain 
which regulate the relationship between the known and unknown, focused and 
defocused elements in creating the blend. The other parallel may be drawn be-
tween the results of these two processes: the photograph as a visual phenome-
non, which exhibits an ideal balance between light and shadow on the one hand; 
and on the other, the blend as a conceptual phenomenon, i.e. the clear and fo-
cused conceptual photograph where the elements of light and dark metaphori-
cally map onto the conceptually known and unknown elements recruited from 
input spaces into the blend.
2.2. Metonymy and conceptual integration 
At this point we turn our attention to the second problem raised earlier in this 
paper, the problem of the relationship between some types of metonymy and 
mental spaces in the process of conceptual integration. One of the papers that 
must be mentioned in that regard is a paper by M. Turner and G. Fauconnier 
(2000) where the authors use several examples to explain the relationship be-
tween metonymic relations in the input spaces and these relations in the blend 
after the completion of conceptual integration. The key notion is the so called 
metonymy projection constraint. The basic idea of this constraint is that some 
indirect metonymic relations from the input spaces become direct metonymic re-
6 KNOWN and UNKNOWN as target domains in these metaphors should not be literally un-
derstood, because they actually mean focused and defocused. 
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lations in the blend, that is, that metonymic links become tighter, and thus 
clearer. One of the especially interesting examples in that regard is the already 
classical, and across different arts quite frequent representation of death as The 
Grim Reaper – skeleton wearing a long black robe and a cowl pulled over his 
head. According to Turner and Fauconnier, this portrayal of death emerges in 
the blend as a result of fusion of elements from multiple mental spaces - (i) the 
space of particular human death; (ii) the space with an abstract model of causal 
relations; (iii) the space with a prototypical human killer and (iv) the space of 
harvest – in which there are certain metonymic relationships. So, for example, 
death in the input space of human dying is metonymically linked to the priest, 
who is associated with dying, funerals and burials. However, the link between 
death and the priest, more precisely his robe, is only indirect in the input space, 
while in the blend it is tightened such that the robe and the cowl, which is attire 
we associate with priests, monks etc. can become the attire of Death. The case is 
similar with the skeleton, which is only connected to death in the input space via 
a high-level metonymy as a RESULT of death for CAUSE – in the blend, how-
ever, this link again becomes direct with the skeleton functioning as the body of 
Death. All in all, this is a prime example of an excellent portrayal of metonymic 
relations within different types of mental spaces, however, one extremely impor-
tant relation has been neglected. In our esteem, the metaphoric-metonymic rela-
tionship between the harvester input space in the harvesting scenario and Death 
as the reaper in the blend has not received the attention it deserves. Namely, the 
wheat from the input space is a metaphor for fertility, which in turn stands 
metonymically as CAUSE for life as its EFFECT7. It is this relationship that al-
lows for a direct link in the blend between death/harvester as collector of har-
vest/life. We further hold that the prototypical human killer, which it seems to 
us, is a somewhat harsh word given the connotations that the canonical represen-
tation of death as reaper (harvester) evokes, from the third input space, should 
be replaced by a sort of a ‘spontaneous’ collector of life whereby no such strong 
emphasis would be placed on the intention as is the case in the killing scenario. 
This claim can be supported if we consider the analogy which can be established 
between the harvester who comes to collect wheat at the end of its natural matu-
ration cycle, and Death which normally comes to take life at the end of the hu-
man life cycle. The above interpretation of the relationship between harvest and 
death, which are not counterparts in the input spaces, allows for the creation of a 
tighter link between them in the blend. Besides the metonymic link to life 
through the aspect of fertility, wheat is also, via fertility, connected to wealth 
7 We could pursue several metonymic-metaphoric routs here. One of them consists in setting 
up the high-level metonymic relation CAUSE FOR EFFECT between wheat and bread in the 
domain of bread manufacturing, and subsequently mapping bread metaphorically onto life, 
via the Biblical motif of the body of Jesus Christ. 
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and prosperity. This metaphoric-metonymic thread allows us to invite into the 
blend a further scenario, the knowledge of the plague epidemics which ravaged 
Europe in the Middle Ages, and which destroyed not only human lives but also 
the fruits of human labour. Needless to say, the artists of the time often por-
trayed the notorious Black Death as a skeleton in a long black robe and a cowl 
over his head, be it in literature or in fine arts. The personification of the plague 
is motivated by a metonymic expansion: PART FOR WHOLE > PLAGUE FOR 
DEATH. Similar to the relation between Death and the skeleton and Death and 
the priest in the input space of individual human dying, in the input space of ab-
stract causal relations, which among other abstract causal relations also hosts 
Death, the plague is but one of the modes of dying (among other terminal dis-
eases). It is only one element of the death domain, however, the link between 
them too becomes tight in the blend. Regarding the Plague example, we should 
mention a very interesting phenomenon which merits further attention and 
elaboration; namely, the phenomenon of switching from metonymic reduction in 
the input spaces to metonymic expansion in the blend. Death and the Plague 
stand in a WHOLE FOR PART relation in the input space of abstract causal re-
lations, plague being just one of terminal illnesses. Through metonymic reduc-
tion, the semantic field of death is narrowed down as the plague is transferred 
into the blend. In the blend, however, the plague, as one of many terminal ill-
nesses, is personified as a character that represents death as a general phenome-
non. This we believe is a result of applying the cognitive operation of meto-
nymic expansion in the blend – plague as a specific CAUSE stands for death as 
a general RESULT. 
This provides additional arguments in support of Turner and Fauconnier’s 
metonymy projection constraint. On the other hand, and even more importantly, 
Ruiz de Mendoza (2000), Ruiz de Mendoza & Peña Cervel (2002) and Ruiz de 
Mendoza & Diez Velasco (2003) discuss the place and manner of metonymy in-
terpretation within metaphorical source and target domains and propose four ba-
sic models: metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source or its parts, meto-
nymic reduction of the metaphoric source or its parts, metonymic expansion of 
the metaphoric target or its parts and finally metonymic reduction of the meta-
phoric target or its parts. Metonymic reduction and metonymic expansion of 
metaphoric domains are actually alternative terms for the two basic metonymic 
relations; namely, for the WHOLE FOR PART relation on the one hand, i.e. 
whereby the target domain is a portion or a subdomain of the source domain - 
target in source metonymy, and on the other, for the PART FOR WHOLE rela-
tion, whereby the source domain is a portion or a subdomain of the target - 
source in target metonymy (Figs. 4-7). 
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           Source Metaphor Target 
            Metonymy
                 Source Target X                             X' 
Fig. 4. Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source or its parts
                               Source                            Metaphor         Target 
Metonymy
                 Source Target X X' 
Fig. 5. Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric source or its parts 
               Source Metaphor Target
                     Metonymy
                   X Source Target X' 
      
Fig. 6. Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric target or its parts 
              Source           Metaphor                         Target 
Metonymy
                  X Target X' Source
Fig. 7. Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric target or its parts 
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Skipping the many illustrations provided by Ruiz de Mendoza and associates, let 
us only mention two examples from Ruiz de Mendoza and Diez Velasco (2003) 
by way of illustration. According to their model, the expression to win one’s 
heart is an example of metonymic reduction of a portion of metaphoric target 
domain (Fig. 7.), namely heart which stands for love as one of its contextually 
determined subdomains8 or active zones. The expression to bite the hand that 
feeds you, on the other hand, would be an example of metonymic expansion of a 
part of metaphoric source domain (Fig. 4.), whereby hand as part of human body 
stands for the human being as a whole, i.e. where hand, as the metonymic source 
domain is just one of the subdomains of human being as the target domain. As is 
evident from Figures 4-7 above, the interpretation of any metonymic relation, be 
it metonymic reduction or metonymic expansion, is performed within the meta-
phoric source or target domain. We will stop here and try to show on several 
counterfactual and metaphorical examples that a more thorough cognitive analy-
sis can lead to somewhat different conclusions, i.e. that metonymy need not nec-
essarily be interpreted within metaphoric source and target domains. We will 
show that there are counterfactual9 and metaphorical utterances where meton-
ymy is interpreted before the input spaces, i.e. before the source and the target 
domain respectively. Such mental spaces, which function as sites of metonymy 
interpretation will be called pre-input spaces in case of counterfactuals and pre-
target space in cases of metonymy-metaphor interaction. We will also attempt to 
identify forces that determine the site of metonymy interpretation, i.e. on the one 
hand, the preconditions that need to be met in order for metonymy to be inter-
preted in pre-input spaces, and on the other, those that have to be met for me-
tonymy to be interpreted within input spaces.    
This brings us back to our example in (2): 
(2) England will find it hard to beat German arguments in favor of Croatia’s 
accession to the European Union.
8 The concept of reciprocation of love, i.e. of mutual infatuation  is really just one of the pos-
sible contextually determined subdomains activated by the notion of heart. This fact is sup-
ported by Croatian examples like ‘imati veliko srce’ (literally: to have a big heart), where con-
text may support the activation of the subdomain of courageousness or generosity and e.g. the 
example ‘biti ne ije srce’ (literally: to be somebody’s heart) whereby a subdomain of another 
kind of love is activated, e.g. motherly love. 
9 It should be pointed out that counterfactuality do not exclude metaphor. Counterfactuals 
may also make use of metaphor, as in the already mentioned famous example If Clinton were 
the Titanic, the iceberg would sink.
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This sentence is an example of a general metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR.10
Since in this example England and Germany trigger a double metonymy 
PLACE FOR INSTITUTION > INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE, and both of the 
metonymies belong to one of three11 general metonymic models, namely, the 
WHOLE FOR PART model, Ruiz de Mendoza et al. (2000, 2002, 2003) would 
propose the activation of the mechanism of metonymic reduction of a portion of 
metaphoric target, whereby the tightening of the part would take place within 
the metaphoric target domain. Figure 7 illustrates the general model of meto-
nymic reduction of a portion of metaphoric target domain; Figure 8. illustrates 
the application of this model to example (2): 
SOURCE           METAPHOR                         TARGET 
               battlefield negotiation table
               weapons arguments
English and German                                             England and Germany        SOURCE                     
Military                                                        
English and German 
Government                       
TARGET 1
    DOUBLE METONYMY 
Members of Engl.  
  and Germ.  
Government TARGET 2
Fig. 8. Metonymic reduction of a portion of metaphoric target domain 
10 G. Lakoff and M. Johnson (1980) discuss this structural metaphor in more detail. 
11 Besides the basic metonymic models WHOLE FOR PART and PART FOR WHOLE, there 
is a third one, though most dubious one—PART FOR PART—to which we shall return later. 
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Let us recall the stages in the formation of the blend (Fig. 3.) and think about 
which elements are highlighted in our consciousness. In other words, which 
subdomains of England and Germany are in the cognitive frontline in on-line in-
terpretation of utterance (2)? Do the English and German national soccer or bas-
ketball teams come to mind, since these subdomains can rightfully claim status 
of active zones in examples like  
(3) England beat Germany in the last World Soccer Championship. 
The answer, of course, is no. At the moment of interpreting sentence (2) what is 
activated in our consciousness are only government members of the two coun-
tries. Thus they have the status of highlighted elements which are tightened as 
the process of conceptual integration unfolds.12 As a result, some remain in the 
input space, while others become focal elements participating in the formation 
of the blend. In other words, this means that this would be the only subdomain 
that is thought of at that moment, the only subdomain that is conceptually pre-
sent in the target domain, while other subdomains of England and Germany (i.e. 
their national sports teams, portions of their geography, their economic re-
sources, etc.) are pushed back in the background. The activation of those do-
mains at that moment, just like the activation of elements of the generic space, 
takes extra cognitive effort. This justifies our assumption that the site of inter-
pretation of that metonymy is not within the metaphoric target, but that the me-
tonymy is already interpreted in some pre-space before conceptual integration 
continues to unfold. Since this metonymy refers to the metaphoric target do-
main, we may call this pre-space a pre-target mental space (Fig. 9.). This pre-
space contains England and Germany with all their subdomains, and at a given 
moment in communication, the subdomain of government members of the two 
governments is extracted, and is transferred into the target domain. Other sub-
domains remain in the pre-target space, their activation remaining latent until 
some other communicative contexts prompt it13 as in (3). Therefore, but also due 
to the fact that interpreting metonymy is an automatic unconscious process, the 
pre-target space is represented in dashed lines, which signals its status as a defo-
cused mental space.14
12 A reduction of this type, illustrated in Figure 3, should be differentiated from the meto-
nymic reduction as advocated by Ruiz de Mendoza et al. (2000, 2002, 2003). Here the ele-
ments are tightened that were left behind after a preceding metonymic reduction of a portion 
of the metaphoric target domain.  
13 The arguments mentioned are reason for the introduction of the context into the basic model 
of conceptual integration in Fig. 2. 
14 While the pre-spaces are defocused spaces as it is the generic space, they are not schematic. 
That is why we divided defocused spaces to schematic and non-schematic earlier in the paper. 
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SOURCE    METAPHOR                      TARGET 
          battlefield negotiation table
          weapons arguments
        Engl. and German Members of Engl. and  
 Military                German Government
PRE-TARGET SPACE
England and Germany SOURCE 1
Engl. and German TARGET 1/SOURCE 2                 
Govern. DOUBLE METONYMIC
REDUCTION
Members of Engl. TARGET 2 
and Germ. Govern. 
Fig. 9. Pre-target mental space 
Let us consider another example of metonymic reduction of the metaphoric 
target domain which squares well with the proposal of introduction of a pre-
target space: 
(4) Most people find James Joyce hard to follow. 
This example could be subsumed under the metaphor UNDERSTANDING (A 
PERSONS IDEAS) IS FOLLOWING (THE PERSON ALONG A CERTAIN 
ROUTE), where James Joyce as a WHOLE stands for his literary works as 
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PART in the metonymic model AUTHOR FOR HIS WORK. As in example (2), 
here too our consciousness only has Joyce’s literary works available at the mo-
ment of interpretation, in other words, the context prompts the extraction of the 
subdomain of Joyce’s literary works from the pre-tagret space, which also con-
tains all other potential subdomains. Then in the process of conceptual integra-
tion, only Joyce’s dense readings (e.g. Ullysses) are projected from the target 
space into the blend thereby gaining features of focal elements. His lighter read-
ings, on the other hand, remain in the target space, retaining the status of high-
lighted elements. The case is similar with metonymic counterfactuals as well (5-
6):
(5) If women hadn’t gotten the pill in the 60s, they wouldn’t be as “free” as 
they are today.
(6) If Hitler had attacked Russia somewhat earlier, he would have gained 
much more Russian ground before the winter. 
The counterfactual in (5) belongs to the metonymic reduction model, i.e. the 
WHOLE FOR PART model. There is no reason to believe that anything other 
than the subdomain of birth control pills is called to mind at the moment of in-
terpreting the sentence. This subdomain is extracted from the pre-input space 
and replanted into the input space, while other non-activated subdomains, e.g. 
painkillers, antidepressants, antibiotics etc. remain latent in the conceptual 
background, i.e. in the defocused pre-input space. Depending on the person in-
terpreting the utterance, their beliefs and experience, different sorts of birth con-
trol pills, which are located in the input space at the beginning of conceptual in-
tegration, are recruited into the blend as the process of conceptual integration 
unfolds.  Some types remain latent in the consciousness, i.e. remain in the input 
space as highlighted elements, while others, i.e. those salient in the individual’s 
experience, are projected into the blend in the capacity of focal elements in the 
hypothetical state of affairs expressed by the sentence.
The Hitler metonymy in counterfactual (6) belongs to the same conceptual in-
tegration type, as far as the process of formation of the blend goes; however, it 
can be interpreted in several ways. The first reading is straightforward, i.e. ex-
hibits the metonymic type COMMANDER FOR THE COMMANDED, while 
the other one is of somewhat more complex nature, instantiating the expansion-
reduction model. The metonymic expansion and reduction are behind the read-
ing in which Hitler as PART, albeit the most important part, yet still a part, 
stands for the WHOLE Germany, which subsequently is reduced down to one of 
its subdomains, the German military. The sentence If Hitler had attacked Russia 
somewhat earlier… can very easily, and very likely, be interpreted as follows If
Germany had attacked Russia somewhat earlier…, in which case a triple meton-
138 B r a n i m i r  B e l a j :   O n  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  s t a t u s  o f  m e n t a l  s p a c e s
ymy is at work: INDIVIDUAL FOR STATE (FOR PLACE) > STATE 
(PLACE) FOR INSTITUTION (i.e. the military as institution) > INSTITUTION 
FOR PEOPLE. The first metonymy in the chain is of the expansion type, the 
remaining two being reduction metonymies. If we interpret example (6) as has 
just been suggested, we could say that the general metonymic model PART 
FOR PART15 is at work here, in which Hitler as PART of the domain of Ger-
many, only indirectly though, stands for its other PART, the German military. In 
the context of establishing metonymic PART FOR PART model, but not in the 
context of pre-spaces, similar is the case with the example
(7) If you have a headache, take an Aspirin.
where the interpretation of metonymy is not performed directly between the As-
pirin as PART and other painkillers as other PARTS of a whole, although such 
views are not to be discarded completely. In this example too we have an indi-
rect link between the parts, via painkillers as a whole. This example first 
prompts the activation of painkillers as a whole through metonymic expansion, 
only later to see that whole reduced down to specific painkillers (Temgesic, 
Darvon, Darvocet etc.), depending on which is one’s medication of choice. This 
makes Ruiz de Mendoza’s (2000) views on non-existence of a general meto-
nymic model PART FOR PART sound somewhat too harsh. In our esteem, this 
model does exist, however, it is most frequently activated indirectly, i.e. after 
the metonymic expansion model PART FOR WHOLE has applied.  
The structure of such metonymies is illustrated in Fig. 10.  
                                              STATE 
                                                                             INSTITUTION 
INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE
Fig. 10. Indirect activation of PART-FOR-PART metonymy  
15 The size of circles in Fig. 10, which stand for the individual (Hitler) as the source domain 
and people as the target domain, shows that the PART FOR PART interpretation really makes 
sense.
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After metonymy has been interpreted in the pre-input space, the process of con-
ceptual integration unfolds according to the same model as illustrated for exam-
ples (2-5). Conceptual integration starts in the input space with the whole Ger-
man military, whose parts are subsequently conceptually reduced only to pre-
serve its one part in the blend (whether it is going to be infantry, heavy artillery, 
air forces etc., will again depend on the individual’s conceptual system). This 
remaining part participates in the creation of a hypothetical situation in which 
some part of the German military penetrates deeper into the Russian territory be-
fore winter. After the activation of the blend, i.e. after it has been set in motion, 
the focal elements of the situations portrayed in (2-6) are subject to various 
elaborations, depending on an individual’s imagery and imaginative capacity. 
The pre-input spaces within the basic model of conceptual integration in on-line 
interpretation are shown in Fig. 11. 
      GENERIC SPACE 
     A                       A 
B                                                                                                     B 
        PRE-INPUT    I1           I2      PRE-INPUT 
             SPACE 1                      SPACE 2 
                    
CONTEXT 
BLEND 
Fig. 11. Pre-input spaces as the site of interpretation of the two basic types of metonymy 
within the basic model of conceptual integration 
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The story is different with examples (8-10):
(8) She went red with rage. 
(9) If you had washed the car yesterday, we would be able to start earlier 
today.
(10) If the burglar had not been forced to break the window, the police would 
have a harder job to do. 
In such examples it is not only the activated subdomains that can be found in the 
input spaces at the moment of interpretation. So the face, exterior of the car and 
window pane as active zones and target domains of metonymic expressions she,
car and window, are only conceptualized within the wholes that metonymically 
determine them. In other words, we cannot speak of the same type of conceptual 
extraction of the target subdomain in examples (8-10) and in the (2-6) examples. 
In examples of this type we cannot speak of metonymy being interpreted within 
a pre-input space, but the subdomains that such metonymies highlight are only 
accentuated, i.e. they come into the forefront of the input spaces, exclusively as 
parts of larger compact wholes. What is it that dictates when metonymy is to be 
interpreted in pre-input spaces and when in input spaces? What kind of cognitive 
phenomenon in some cases requires the formation of pre-input spaces while in 
others not? Answers to these questions can be found in the nature of the rela-
tionship between parts and wholes in the extralinguistic world, which map onto 
the realm of human conceptualization. In cases of domains like England and
Germany, pills, J. Joyce, Hitler, etc., there is a huge number of distinct subdo-
mains which may be conceptualized and activated independent from one an-
other. Those subdomains make separate units, which in turn often consist of a 
number of subdomains themselves. Thus one of the many subdomains of Eng-
land is its government, which has several subdomains of its own (a large number 
of different ministries), which, as superordinate domains, branch off into still 
further subdomains (different sections within a single ministry) etc. Pills, too, 
exhibit multiple subdomains like birth control pills, painkillers, antibiotics etc., 
which branch into its own subdomains, e.g. different kinds of birth control pills, 
different kinds of painkillers etc. Such examples form a hierarchical network of 
domains and subdomains which all have potential for independent conceptuali-
zation. On the other hand, metonymies of the window, car and human body type, 
are not interpreted in pre-input spaces as their subdomains form compact wholes 
whereby it is only then possible to conceptualize individual parts as active zones 
in a given context if they are part of some other part, some other subdomain, 
most frequently of a whole. That is why face, the exterior of the car and window
pane in examples (8-10) as active zones or salient subdomains can only be con-
ceptualized within a whole, i.e. their projection into the blend in the mentioned 
hypothetical situations is only possible as parts of the entire human body, the en-
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tire car and window frame as indivisible wholes respectively. (2-6) on the other 
hand contain salient subdomains that are independently projected into the blend, 
without co-activation of other subdomains. In other words, such examples create 
a network of profile - base - domain relations, or, according to Langacker 
(1987), a network of abstract domains, in which some subdomains function as 
bases, i.e. as the immediate conceptual context inevitable in conceptualizing 
other subdomains. Fig.12. illustrates the metonymic relation described in (2-6) 
with conceptually delineated and independent subdomains, while Fig. 13. is a 
diagrammatic representation of (8-10) with their individually inaccessible and 
dependent parts which only make sense as parts of larger wholes or the whole. 
As in cases like (8-10), and unlike in cases like (2-6), there is no possibility of 
conceptual extraction of individual subdomains, there are thus no theoretical 
grounds for the establishment of pre-input spaces. Such compact units are di-
rectly projected into the blend, i.e. from the inputs, whereby metonymy is inter-
preted along the route leading from the input space to the blend. It is very impor-
tant to point out that pre-input spaces shold be understood only as a theoretical 
model whose only purpose is to explain differences in number and type of sub-
domains that could be activated by some metonymic expression in particular 
contexts.
A                                                        A
B
            B
Fig. 12. Metonymic relation with      Fig. 13. Diagrammatic representation with
conceptually delineated and independent    individually inaccessible and dependent
subdomains             parts
In view of what has just been said, we propose the following hypothesis:
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The Pre-input Spaces Hypothesis:
The likelihood of creation of pre-input spaces as sites of metonymy interpreta-
tion is proportional to the number of different subdomains contained by the 
whole, and that in proportion to the degree of their discreteness and the de-
gree of their separability from the whole. 
3. Conclusion 
The Conceptual Integration Theory has shown to be one of the most intriguing 
and most interesting theory in cognitive approaches to language. Its methodo-
logical apparatus opens avenues of research into the ways humans think and 
conceptualize, and so facilitates the analysis of mountains of linguistic phenom-
ena. Yet, what seems to be missing in the theory, and which we have tried to 
point out here, is a more detailed articulation of the role and nature of mental 
spaces in on-line communication. This paper was an attempt to bridge the gap 
between theoretical assumptions and their implementation in actual communica-
tive contexts. In an attempt to present a more thorough and complete cognitive 
analysis of mental spaces and their elements in a communication process, i.e. in 
on-line interpretation, we divided them into (i) defocused (generic space and 
pre-input spaces), (ii) highlighted (input spaces) and (iii) focal space (blend). 
Such conceptual nuancing of the different mental spaces and their elements 
brings the multi-space theoretical framework closer to the human being in his 
actual linguistic activities, which, after all, is the purpose and ultimate objective 
of any cognitive analysis. 
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O KOGNITIVNOM STATUSU MENTALNIH PROSTORA I O NEKIM TIPOVIMA 
METONIMIJE U OKVIRU TEORIJE KONCEPTUALNE INTEGRACIJE 
U svjetlu trenutnosti procesa konceptualne integracije kriti ki se pristupa kognitivno- 
konceptualnom status etiriju vrsta mentalnih prostora i njihovih elemenata: ulaznih prostora, 
generi koga prostora te blenda, a u skladu s razlikama me u njima dijele se na defokusirane, 
istaknute i fokalne mentalne prostore. Tako er se raspravlja i o mjestu i na inu interpretacije 
nekih tipova metonimije u kontekstu te teorije i predlaže se uvo enje petoga mentalnog 
prostora - predulaznoga prostora ukoliko je rije  o protu injeni nom iskazu, odnosno 
predizvornoga i predciljnoga prostora ukoliko se radi o djelovanju metonimije unutar 
metafori koga iskaza, kao mjesta njihove interpretacije.  
Klju ne rije i: temeljni model konceptualne integracije; ulazni prostori; generi ki prostor; 
blend; elementi mentalnih prostora; defokusirani, istaknuti i fokalni mentalni prostori; 
predulazni prostori; metafora; metonimija. 
